Mass Escapes of Foreign IS Detainees from al-Hol, Fueled by IS-Linked Global Fundraising Networks, Pose Urgent Security Threats

Mona Thakkar & Anne Speckhard

Over 6000 foreign IS women and children escaped from the heavily guarded annex of al-Hol camp exploiting the security vacuum during the chaotic January handover of the camp from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to the Syrian government. Thousands of IS women were reportedly spirited out in midnight convoys toward northwestern Idlib ostensibly directly or indirectly aided by Syrian security forces guarding the camp who turned a blind eye towards their departure. Similar accounts were pushed by IS women and their family members on encrypted apps and through direct communications with ICSVE. The escaped pro- IS women, on Telegram claimed that the “new guard dogs of Julani” expressed sympathy over “unfair detention” of IS women and allowed them to flee by accepting bribes and by colluding with IS operatives in facilitating their escapes. Most of the IS women apart from traveling to Idlib, a long time safe refuge for them, also illicitly entered into neighboring Turkey and Iraq. The U.S. intelligence also concluded that “15,000 to 20,000 people including IS affiliated individuals escaped and are now at large in Syria.”

Rumors and misinformation were rife during their escape. Pro-IS women claimed that the “Sawahat factions” referring to the Syrian government forces, operated an aggressive media campaign for slandering IS by claiming themselves as “saviors” of the IS women and by blaming IS for perpetuating violence inside the camp. They also claimed the Syrian government forces spread rumors of the SDF retaking control of the camp to prompt other detainees to escape. On their side, the Syrian government acknowledged the mass escapes alleging the entrenched smuggling routes, unreliable documentation records and the use of forged registration data by residents in the names of those who left has made it difficult to determine who has actually escaped. The escape of over 6000 IS detainees, most of them children, but in many cases with very dedicated pro-IS mothers, creates new vectors for IS recruitment, financing, and clandestine regrouping. 

Amidst this backdrop, ICSVE has closely monitored fundraising efforts and discourse of many IS-linked English, Russian, German and Arabic networks to financially aid IS women fugitives for their sustenance helping them with their rent, food, clothing and medical aid expenses. The networks rallied supporters to donate more generously during the holy month of Ramadan, a period traditionally marked by heightened charitable giving. IS through its official al-Naba editorial addressed the situation of the detained IS fighters and IS women at length and called upon local Syrians to aid them with every possible means without claiming any direct involvement in their escapes. The supporters online however remain divided on this matter. Some issued  a flurry of appeals to help the escapees by providing shelter, accommodation, and safe transport while others cautioned the IS women against accepting any such help from strangers claiming that these tactics are meant to lure them and turn them over to the Syrian security forces.

Female IS supporters that escaped through smuggling between 2020-2022 also released operational guidelines for the new escapees in the face of growing crackdowns and intense government scrutiny against them. They claim that many “migrant sisters” have been missing as they made their way to Idlib. These security guidelines for IS women emphasize strict social interaction online and offline for maintaining anonymity and warn about divulging any personal information regarding their country of origin, age, their families, their life under the IS caliphate, ideological orientation and of their time spent in detention camps. The guidance anticipates questioning and speculation by local Syrian residents and instructs IS women to remain superficial and non-disclosing, in their interactions with neighbors, locals, and to remain confined to their homes. They are asked to present themselves as “muhajirin who came to Syria to live under Sharia,” while avoiding discussion on any theological or religious topics that would reveal their support for IS or circulating any material from any jihadist ideologues or talking to recent converts who ask  them questions about their faith. They are also warned from circulating any pro-IS propaganda posts in their fundraising channels on Telegram to avoid frequent takedown of their accounts that would also disrupt their donation campaigns. Further warnings are regarding joining any new discussion groups on WhatsApp and Telegram that seemingly appear in support of the group claiming that many IS women have complained of hacking instances and infiltration of their communication devices and the closure of  IS-linked intermediary PayPal and bank accounts. Other digital security measures include erasing or replacing old communication devices, SIM cards, phone numbers, and online social media accounts previously used by women in the camps.

IS women fugitives also are asked to regulate social interaction of their children, preventing them from using any references of camps, IS figures, or IS lexicon like “Baqiyah” (Arabic term signifying the return and expansion of the IS Caliphate)  in public spaces claiming that the children of the IS women have been approached and “exploited” by the Syrian intelligence elements to know about their parents’ whereabouts. IS women are asked to teach children informally with recommendation of homeschooling or private tutors with focus on providing lessons on creed and methodology. The guidelines suggest adopting alternate names and kunyas, from time to time and renting houses preferably under the name and identification of a trusted Syrian intermediary warning that Syrian security forces are tracking them through owners who rented their properties to the IS women and via real estate offices. For securing long term financial support, IS women are advised to seek prospective husbands with marriages required to be internally sanctioned by official IS Qadis. These guidelines thus aim to educate the IS women about their operational security, at a time when the IS women voice frustration over the donors’ recklessness in sharing sensitive information about their whereabouts leading to their arrest. 

On the other hand, another pro-IS network which was operated by Iraqi IS women from inside al-Hol is called the Central Channel with the “official administrator” of this channel saying that she came out of al-Hol. The network claims to operate under IS’s  Prisoners and Martyrs department headed by an individual called Abu Abdullah Al Halabi. This pro-IS network claims that IS mobilized its fighters to free the female detainees and burned down a prison at al-Hol to destroy the “security information” of third -country IS women. It has positioned itself as the primary gatekeeping and counter-intelligence hub and the only reliable fundraising network for IS women that channels donations to IS women without any intermediaries. The Central channel claims that a core problem among IS women escapees is their complacency and lack of security awareness, which only shifted after “brothers” (IS fighters) began exposing intelligence networks that had been fraudulently posing as IS supporters, siphoning funds intended for detainees. The channel claims that Egyptian, Algerian, Turkish IS women while fleeing were thus captured due to their recklessness and attempts to educate them by long winded Telegram posts regarding the deceptive strategies employed by the “enemies” to hunt down the women and IS fugitives.

This pro-IS network also alleges that the ethnic and linguistic ethnicities of foreign fighters in the Syrian army are exploited to interact and secure trust of third country IS women. The channel cited the example of fighters from the Turkistani Islamic Party luring Uyghur IS women with offers of reduced smuggling fees, rent assistance, food aid, and free accommodation in Idlib in order to use them as entry points to infiltrate their networks. They further allege that the Europeans, particularly absconding German IS women supporters in Idlib, are being monitored and targeted by government forces  “by separating them from their children” as leverage to force their repatriation.  They also claim that intelligence forces even pose as religious figures providing Islamic healing and dream interpreting advice on Telegram to approach IS women,  attribute false killings and violent attacks to IS and exploit the group’s operational silence to entrap IS women. Yet they claim that IS operatives in Idlib remain in constant contact with these women. The Central channel in the past few weeks also reprimanded what are known as some high profile Arabic speaking IS propagandists claiming they operate under multiple aliases, running fraudulent financing schemes in the name of IS women. This precipitated internal frictions within the pro-IS online communities, which has long collided over supporter-led initiatives and disagreements regarding the legitimacy of these fundraisers, fraudulent use of charity diverted away from them, and which leaves the group’s supporters exposed to infiltration attempts. 

Other infiltration tactics include bribing the IS women disillusioned with the group to act as “official representatives” of all IS women to promote narratives that they have all renounced the group, and endorse repatriation. The Central network also demanded that their affairs should be overseen by the IS leadership in Iraq as the Syrian IS rank and file has been exposed to “corruption and infiltration”.  The Central network also demands monthly stipends ranging between $100- $250  per family for IS women along with food baskets and medical assistance at a time when women still largely secure aid through crowdfunding efforts. Central Channel also recently has started seeking donations for the small-business initiatives led by foreign IS fugitives running mobile fruit and vegetable carts and home based cooking businesses to generate their own income. It requires that donations be handled exclusively through approved male relatives or intermediaries emphasizing economic self-reliance, and teaching children trade skills instead of relying on charity. IS sympathizers have thus revamped their operational awareness by issuing regular alerts in internal Telegram groups about security operations and government aligned individuals targeting IS women fugitives to prevent their re-arrest. 

The Central Channel’s recent appeals have focused on securing aid for children with life-threatening illnesses requiring urgent medical care, while aiding escapees along with outlining a structured hybrid fundraising mechanism targeting supporters abroad. Donations are primarily requested in Bitcoin and TRC 20 donations controlled by designated female intermediaries, centralizing fund custody while relying on decentralized assets to bypass formal oversight. In parallel, the network promotes sending donations through Sham Cash, an online popular payment application now semi- formalized in Syria ,but accompanied with greater security and technical concerns associated with hawala style payments. This application is employed as an alternative to the lack of cryptocurrency access. The network also widely raised funds to top up prepaid recharge cards from Iraqi telecom providers such as Asiacell and Korek, which were used by detainees in camps to communicate with the outside world and coordinate fundraising efforts. Donations were funneled through specific money transfer offices in Aleppo and Idlib, with instructions to accept transfers in Turkish lira rather than Syrian lira to obfuscate the origin of funds. Taken together, these measures reflect coordinated identity anonymization through the use of diverse financial channels

On the other hand, IS supporters in Europe have launched dozens of similar appeals on crowdfunding sites like Gofund me using vague language that donations are intended for “needy Muslims during Ramadan”. In Telegram posts, a Finland-based sympathizer claimed that after GoFundMe blocked his donations campaigns, he circumvented moderation by launching a zero fee campaign on Good Launch, a crowdfunding platform exclusively for  Muslim causes raising about $5,000 for IS women escapees. These pleas highlight the crowdfunding sites’ greater adaptability, wider reach and legitimacy cover with the shutdown of crowdfunding pleas leading the supporter to seek crypto donations. German IS-linked entities have been earlier found using formal European banking channels along with crypto and Paypal.  Russian fundraisers on the other hand traditionally relied on  Russian state bank SBER transfers with Western Union transfers that are directed to intermediaries in Turkey, which has been a major fundraising conduit for official IS linked networks. Reports have emerged that financial aid for the escapes have been secured through TikTok live streams and cryptocurrency transfers. 

Similarly ICSVE came across few Russian language fundraising campaigns providing generous donations of  $500 to $1000 monthly aid per family  for covering rent and other monthly expenses for many  Russian IS women.  Pro-IS  English-language networks appeal explicitly to raise funds for operational IS militants in Syria and their families, particularly those imprisoned or unable to work due to security crackdowns. A fundraising channel on Instagram ostensibly by pro-IS propagandist Peshawari Sadaqah ostensibly raised funds before his alleged arrest for jihadist IS fighters in Britain and their families via PayPal and bank transfers through the British online bank Monzo. This suggests the growing priority and mobilization of pro-IS financial actors in equally providing material support in the form of legal aid for IS-linked individuals detained in their home countries. 

While countries like Britain, Albania recently repatriated their IS women and children, countries like Australia amongst others have refused to repatriate their IS women and fighters. IS-linked Telegram channels online claim that a few French women from al-Roj, where the detainees are still held have also rejected repatriation. Few IS women from al-Roj camp are hoping for a  Syrian government takeover of the camp, arguing that it would facilitate their release, much like the escapes of women from Al-Hol. Pro-IS media channels also reinforced this narrative by eulogizing an Egyptian-born member of the Syrian security forces, portraying him as a “martyr” after he was killed during clashes with the Syrian government forces at al-Hol camp for aiding the detainees in their escape. They suggested that other foreign Islamist fighters in the Syrian army would likewise enable similar breakouts from al-Roj. However, the SDF, which oversees Al-Roj camp, has indicated that Al-Roj, like Al-Hol, may also close in the coming days, diminishing their hopes of any further instability leading to mass breakouts.

IS female acolytes now at large frame their release as a divine reward for their steadfast faith, doubling down on their support for IS and claiming that this “reward” came in the form of “freedom from captivity” without paying a single dollar or hefty smuggling fees. The current fund raising ecosystem for these escapees is reinforced by cross-border fundraising networks, largely composed of global IS sympathizers who utilize diverse financial channels, including cryptocurrencies, bank transfers, crowdfunding platforms, PayPal, prepaid cards, and money transfer services such as Western Union. Additionally, most cryptocurrency-related terrorism reportedly arrests of IS supporters worldwide have been linked to these campaigns, which finance IS women detainees under the guise of humanitarian aid.

Some IS women fugitives online continue to oppose repatriation, particularly for their children, arguing that their return would force them to “live among apostates,” separate families, and stray away from their faith. Many cling to their children as their only remaining anchor and leverage them to elicit sympathy and financial support from sympathizers as they fear long prison sentences and social marginalization due to the repatriation. Meanwhile, Syrian authorities lack comprehensive records on those at large, complicating efforts to identify, track, them. The refusal of some countries to repatriate their nationals will provide IS women with another opportunity to evade accountability and attempt to rebuild their lives in Syria. This, however, carries significant risks. Children remaining with their pro-IS mothers in such environments remain at the heightened risk of radicalization and recruitment by IS and other jihadist groups, particularly now that the IS women are no longer in detention.

We must recall that al Qaeda in Iraq, once largely defeated, reconstituted itself with a massive jailbreak of AQ fighters and become IS. Similarly, we have seen IS and AQ deploy women in various operational roles when facing security pressures or resource shortages. This influx of IS women into Idlib creates a new pool of potential operatives, particularly foreign women who remain deeply dedicated to the group, and who may attempt to bypass security measures to move through neighboring Turkey and porous routes in Greece back into Europe to carry out attacks. Experts have warned that the unchecked movement of IS women escapes —without identification, oversight, or reintegration—poses security risks not only for Syria and Iraq but also for their home countries. At the same time, IS and other Salafi-jihadi groups may exploit these escapes to recruit both current fugitives and future escapees, contributing to the group’s resurgence and its potential to carry out attacks locally and globally.

 

Mona Thakkar is a research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Violent Extremism, where she focuses on monitoring militant jihadist groups and their financial networks. Follow Mona on X: @ t16_mona 

Anne Speckhard, Ph.D., is Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) and served for over 2 decades as Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown University School of Medicine and also served as an Affiliate in the Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University.

She has interviewed over 800 terrorists, violent extremists, their family members and supporters around the world, including in Western Europe, the Balkans, Central Asia, the Former Soviet Union and the Middle East. Over the past five years, she has conducted in-depth psychological interviews with 273 ISIS defectors, returnees and prisoners, as well as 16 al Shabaab cadres (as well as family members and ideologues,) studying their trajectories into and out of terrorism, and their experiences inside ISIS and al Shabaab.

Speckhard developed the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project from these interviews, which includes over 250 short counter narrative videos that mimic ISIS recruitment videos but contain actual terrorists strongly denouncing ISIS as un-Islamic, corrupt and brutal. These videos have been utilized in over 200 Facebook and Instagram campaigns globally. Beginning in 2020, she launched the ICSVE Escape Hate Counter Narrative Project, interviewing dozens of white supremacists and members of hate groups, developing counternarratives from their interviews, and creating anti-recruitment videos. She has also conducted rare interviews with five Antifa activists (Antifa protestors rarely grant interviews.)

Dr. Speckhard is also an expert in rehabilitation and repatriation of terrorists and their families. In 2007, she designed the psychological and Islamic aspects of the Detainee Rehabilitation Program in Iraq to be applied to 20,000+ detainees and 800 juveniles. This work led to consulting with foreign governments on issues of terrorist prevention, interventions and repatriation; and the rehabilitation and reintegration of ISIS foreign fighters, wives and children. She has worked with NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UN Women, United Nations Countering Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC), the EU Commission and EU Parliament, and to the U.S. Senate & House, Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Health & Human Services, and the FBI.

Today Dr. Speckhard actively trains key stakeholders in law enforcement, intelligence, elite hostage negotiation teams, educators, and other professionals in countering violent extremism, locally and internationally. Her focus is on the psychology of terrorism, the effective use of counter-narrative messaging materials produced by ICSVE, as well as studying the use of children as violent actors by groups such as ISIS. Her consultations and trainings include U.S., Canadian, German, British, Dutch, Austrian, Swiss, Belgian, Danish, Iraqi, Syrian, Jordanian and Thai national police and security officials, among others.

Dr. Speckhard is the author of five terrorist related books: Homegrown Hate, Talking to Terrorists, Bride of ISIS, Undercover Jihadi, and ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate. She has appeared on CNN, BBC, NPR, Fox News, MSNBC, CTV, CBC, and in the New York Times, Washington Post, London Times, TIME Magazine, Newsweek, Daily Beast and more. She regularly writes a column for Homeland Security Today. Her research has been published in Global Security: Health, Science and Policy, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Journal of African Security, Journal of Strategic Security, the Journal of Human Security, Bidhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, Journal for Deradicalization, Perspectives on Terrorism and the International Studies Journal.  Her academic publications are found at https://georgetown.academia.edu/AnneSpeckhard and www.icsve.org.

ICSVE’s Breaking the ISIS Brand and Escape Hate Counternarrative videos and training seminars can be watched on ICSVE’s YouTube channel.

ICSVE’s research has been funded by the EU Commission; U.S. Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense and Justice; UN Women; and the Embassy of Qatar.

Follow @AnneSpeckhard and @annespeckhard.bsky.social

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